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Using Article IV of the Illinois Constitution to Attack
Legislation Passed by the General Assembly
Michael J. Kasper*
Otto von Bismarck famously declared that "[l]aws are like sausages.
It's better not to see them being made." 1 Imagine what the great
nineteenth century Prussian would say today about the Illinois General
Assembly. Each year, thousands of bills are introduced in the Illinois
House of Representatives and Senate, and several hundred are usually
passed and signed into law by the governor. Sometimes, those
aggrieved by their enactment challenge the constitutionality of these
bills. Many are familiar with the substantive bases for challenging a
legislative enactment-it violates the First Amendment, or Equal
Protection, or, in the case of tax legislation, the so-called Uniformity
Clause. However, fewer people understand that it is also possible to
challenge a legislative enactment on procedural grounds. Such a
challenge can be raised when the process used by the General
Assembly, and perhaps the governor, in conducting business and
enacting laws is inconsistent with specific requirements set forth in
article IV of the Illinois Constitution.
Aggrieved parties and their attorneys should take note of these nonsubstantive provisions that provide alternative grounds on which newly
enacted state laws may be invalidated. The procedural and substantive
safeguards built into the legislative article of the constitution are the
best, but perhaps most under-utilized, tools against the United States
Supreme Court's famous warning more than 140 years ago: "[n]o man's
2
life, liberty or property are safe while the Legislature is in session."
This Article will discuss the various methods that may be employed
under article IV of the Illinois Constitution-the legislative article-for

* Michael Kasper is the former General Counsel and Parliamentarian of the Illinois House of
Representatives, an Adjunct Professor at Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, and a
partner at Fletcher, O'Brien, Kasper & Nottage. He attended the University of Notre Dame and
Northwestern University School of Law.
1. The Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com/search.php3?homesearch=Bismarck
(last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
2. Final Accounting in the Estate of A.B., I Tucker (N.Y. Suff.) 247,249 (1866).
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challenging bills passed by the General Assembly and signed by the
governor. Part I examines the constitutional requirement that legislation
be limited to a single subject, and that bills making appropriations of
state monies not contain any other substantive provisions. It also
discusses what happens when that requirement is not met and how
challenges can be brought. Parts II and III look at the principal
procedural requirements imposed on the General Assembly; namely,
that a bill be read by title on three separate days and set forth
completely all sections of the law it proposes to amend. Part IV posits
that the date upon which a bill passes in the General Assembly and
becomes effective could provide a basis for challenging legislation.
Part V notes that a challenge can also be raised if the legislature violated
the constitutional prohibition against special legislation. Finally, Part
VI discusses the power the Illinois Constitution gives the governor to
issue an amendatory veto, and argues that a veto that exceeds that
authority could also be vulnerable to challenge.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE
3
The Illinois Constitution, like those of forty-two other states,
constrains the legislature in its deliberation of legislation. The most
significant, and therefore most litigated procedural requirement, is the
so-called Single Subject Rule, which is found in article IV, section 8(d),
of the Illinois Constitution: "[b]ills, except bills for appropriations and
for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined
' 4
to one subject.
The Single Subject Rule serves the dual purposes of: (1) preventing
the passage of legislation that, standing alone, could not muster the
votes necessary for passage; and (2) facilitating an orderly legislative
procedure. 5 The idea is that the legislature can better understand and
debate a bill if it concerns only a single subject and that "an individual
legislator may be unable to appreciate all of the nuances and
6
implications of a bill containing numerous unrelated provisions."

3.

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES

AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 330 (3d ed. 2004).

4. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d). A "revisory bill" is "one that makes no substantive changes and
adds no new matter to existing legislation," but instead "merely incorporates the provisions of
prior legislative amendments." See, e.g., People v. Reedy, 692 N.E.2d 376, 384 (II1.App. Ct.
1998).
5.

Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. REV. 389,

391 (1958).
6. Reedy, 692 N.E.2d at 382; see also Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago, 311 N.E.2d 116, 122
(I11.1974).
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Section 8(d) also provides that "[a]ppropriation bills shall be limited to
7
the subject of appropriations."
States first recognized the need for a single subject restriction after
the infamous "Yazoo Act" in the Georgia legislature in 1795.8 In that
scandal, the Georgia legislature passed a bill containing numerous
provisions, 9 buried amongst which was the order to sell vast amounts of
state land to specific companies. 10 The next year, after the predictable
resulting scandal, the legislature attempted to undo the transfer through
a subsequent enactment, but the Supreme Court upheld the original
enactment and held that the second statute could not divest the
11
purchaser's title to the land acquired under the original enactment.
While perhaps not as colorful as the infamous Yazoo Act, the Single
Subject Rule has enjoyed a long and fascinating history before the
Illinois Supreme Court. The rule was virtually ignored for the first
twenty-five years of the constitution's life. In fact, the Illinois Supreme
Court gave only passing attention to the rule between its enactment in
1970 and the mid-1990s, and did not invalidate any legislation for
violating the rule. 12 When confronted with single subject challenges,
the court consistently ruled that matters germane to the subject of a bill
include those matters that address "the means reasonably necessary or
13
appropriate to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose."
Consequently, legislative provisions for the development of stagnant
vacant property were found to be related to a bill concerned with the
elimination of slums. 14 Similarly, a gasoline tax was properly included
in legislation providing funding for the Regional Transportation
7. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d). An appropriation bill is one that provides for the expenditure of
funds from the State treasury, and any provision that "purported to change the existing general
substantive law . . . was therefore itself substantive in nature, and could not be included in the
appropriation bill." Benjamin v. Devon Bank, 368 N.E.2d 878, 880-81 (I11.1977).
8. ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 330.
9. The Yazoo Act was entitled "An act supplementary to an act for appropriating part of the
unlocated territory of this state, for the payment of the late state troops, and for other purposes
therein mentioned, and declaring the right of this state to the unappropriated territory thereof, for
the protection and support of the frontiers of this state, and for other purposes." Id. n.j.
10. Id.
11. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 140 (1810).
12. Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago, 311 N.E.2d 116, 122 (I11.1974) (evaluating legislation
vesting the State with exclusive power to regulate professions in Illinois by referencing the titles
of Acts concerning thirty different professions). The court stated that the Rule's purpose was
relevant in deciding whether a violation existed, as the bill constituted "an assault upon municipal
powers of regulation by a combination of groups of businesses subject to those regulations." Id.
at 121. However, even though Fuehrmeyer involved the Single Subject Rule, the court's decision
turned on other issues.
13. People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 111 N.E.2d 626, 632 (I11.1953).
14. Id.
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Authority and the development of public transportation, because
transportation systems rely heavily on taxation to develop and maintain
their operations.] 5
However, during the mid-to-late 1990s, the Illinois Supreme Court
considered a series of cases in rapid succession that briefly reinvigorated the rule. Ultimately, though, subsequent decisions greatly
diminished the Single Subject Rule as an effective method for
challenging legislation.
A. Revival of the Single Subject Rule
16
The court's first decision in this succession, Johnson v. Edgar,
involved an egregious instance of legislative "logrolling," the practice
of linking unpopular measures with insufficient support to pass on their
own with more popular measures to ensure the passage of the less
popular measure. 17 In Johnson, the court considered a bill that included
a provision imposing a gasoline tax to provide funding for the clean-up
of old, leaking storage tanks that were buried underground. 8 This
measure had been defeated as a stand-alone bill. 19 Later, the provision
was amended onto a bill creating Illinois' first sex-offender registry; a
20
measure, needless to say, that was enormously politically popular.
Additionally, a controversial measure allowing employers to eavesdrop
the
on their employees was also included in the bill.2 1 When combined,
22
bill containing all three provisions passed the General Assembly.
In holding that the legislation violated the Single Subject Rule, the
court concluded that the rule prohibited legislation containing
"[d]iscordant provisions that by no fair intendment can be considered as
having any legitimate relation to each other." 23 The court stated that
although the Rule is to be liberally construed and the subject may be "as

15. Cutinello v. Whitley, 641 N.E.2d 360, 366 (Ill. 1994).
16. 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (Ill. 1997).
17. Fuehrmeyer, 311 N.E.2d at 121 (stating that the Single Subject Rules prevents "[t]he
practice of bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature, and having no necessary
connection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage
of several measures, no one of which could succeed upon its own merits").
18. 680 N.E.2d at 1374.
19. See H.B. 901, 89th G.A. (Il1. 1996).
20. Child Sex Offender Community Notification Law, P.A. 89-428, 1995 I11. Laws 428
(1995); Johnson, 680 N.E.2d at 1380.
21. Child Sex Offender Community Notification Law, P.A. 89-428, § 601, 1995 111.Laws 428

(1995).
22. Johnson, 680 N.E.2d at 1375.
23. Id. at 1379 (citing People ex rel.Ogilvie v. Lewis, 274 N.E.2d 87, 94 (111. 1971)).
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broad as the legislature chooses," the items included in an enactment
24
must have a "natural and logical connection."
The court recognized that the "subject" of a bill was also to be
liberally construed and as broad as the legislature chooses. 25 Its
examination of Public Act 89-428, which was entitled, "An Act in
relation to public safety," revealed "subjects as diverse as child sex
offenders, employer eavesdropping, and environmental impact fees
imposed on the sale of fuel."' 26 The court invalidated the Act, stating:
"[w]ere we to conclude that the many obviously discordant provisions
contained in Public Act 89-428 are nonetheless related because of a
tortured connection to a vague notion of public safety, we would be
essentially eliminating the [S]ingle [S]ubject [R]ule as a meaningful
constitutional check on the legislature's actions."27
Shortly after Johnson, the court revisited the Single Subject Rule
three times within one year: twice regarding sweeping criminal law
proposals, and once regarding implementation of the state budget. First,
in People v. Reedy, the court considered the validity of legislation
including the then popular "truth-in-sentencing" provisions of the Code
of Corrections, with topics like the duties and jurisdiction of local law
enforcement officials, asset forfeiture proceedings arising from drug
offenses, and the perfection and attachment of hospital liens. 28 The
original bill had been titled "A Bill for an Act concerning the insanity
defense," but after the amendments were added the title was changed to
"An Act in relation to governmental matters." 2 9 The court found the
inclusion of a hospital lien provision fatal to the bill's
constitutionality. 30 Despite recognizing the wide latitude given to the
legislature, the court concluded:
Even when giving great deference to the legislature, the most lenient
examination of the Act shows that its contents encompass at least two
unrelated subjects: matters relating to the criminal justice system, and
matters relating to hospital liens. In our opinion, even
the most liberal
31
attempt to reconcile these two subjects is unavailing.

24. Id.; see also Cutinello v. Whitley, 641 N.E.2d 360, 366 (I1. 1994) (defining the term
"subject" under the Single Subject Rule).
25. Johnson, 680 N.E.2d at 1379.
26. Id. at 1380.
27. Id. at 1381.
28. 708 N.E.2d 1114, 1119 (Il. 1999).
29. Id. at 1118.
30. Id. at 1119.
31. Id.
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In rejecting "governmental matters" as a proper single subject, the
court concluded "[a]s we cautioned in Johnson, the permitted use of
such a sweeping and vague category to unite unrelated measures32would
render the single subject clause of our constitution meaningless."
At the end of the year, the court considered People v. Cervantes, a
33
challenge to an enactment entitled, "Safe Neighborhoods Law."
Similar to the bill in Johnson, the act challenged in Cervantes amended
nine different code sections, including the WIC Vendor Management
Act,34 the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act, the Vehicle Code,
the Juvenile Court Act, the Criminal Code, the Cannabis Control Act,
the Controlled Substances Act, the Rights of Crime Victims and
Witnesses Act, and the Unified Code of Corrections. 35 The court was
particularly troubled by the inclusion of WIC related provisions:
Contrary to the State's assertions, none of the amendments to the WIC
Vendor Management Act mention abuse of WIC benefits, criminal
WIC fraud, criminal penalties, or forfeiture. The plain language of the
WIC Vendor Management Act indicates that the provisions bestow
authority upon the Department to operate the WIC program and
govern the day-to-day operations of WIC retail vendors. We cannot
discern, and the State has been unable to establish, how any of these
provisions
bear a natural and logical connection to neighborhood
36
safety.
Just as it had rejected the concept of "public safety" as a legitimate
subject in Johnson, the court thus rejected "neighborhood safety" as a
proper single subject. In Johnson, the title "public safety" was so broad
and vague as to be virtually meaningless. 37 Viewed in this light, the
provisions of the legislation in Johnson-gasolinetaxes, eavesdropping,
and sex offender registration-cannot, by any fair interpretation, be
reasonably related to each other. On the other hand, all of the
provisions contained in the legislation considered in Cervantes, with the
exception of the WIC matters, were reasonably related to the overall
theme of crime prevention. Had the WIC provisions been omitted from
the bill, the court would no doubt have upheld it.

32. Id.
33. 723 N.E.2d 265, 266 (Ill. 1999).
34. "WIC" is short for Women, Infants & Children. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d at 268.
35. Id. at 269.
36. Id. at 271-72.
37. As an historical aside, Robspiere's "Committee on Public Safety" constructed a guillotine
in Paris' Tuileries Garden to institute the reign of terror after the French revolution. SIMON
SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 619-21 (1989).
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Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court had settled into a routine of

rejecting most single subject claims and invalidating legislation in
egregious cases, and the rule had become an effective mechanism for
policing legislation. However, this did not last long.
B. Waning of the Single Subject Rule
In Arangold v. Zehnder, curiously decided between Reedy and
Cervantes, the court considered legislation entitled "FY1996 Budget

Implementation Act" in order to "make the changes in State programs
that are necessary to implement the Governor's FY1996 budget
recommendations." 38 A joint conference committee was appointed that
advised changing the bill's title to "An Act concerning State services,
amending named Acts," and also suggested adopting a new and lengthy
set of substantive provisions. 39 In the end, the
legislation challenged in
40
Arangold amended twenty-one separate laws.
In upholding the legislation, a divided court rejected the argument
that either the number of provisions in a bill or a bill's length

determined a single subject violation, instead concluding that "[w]hat is
dispositive is whether the contents included within the enactment have a

38. Arangold v. Zehnder, 718 N.E.2d 191, 194 (I11.1999).
39. Id. at 194-95 (citing V 1995 111.S.J. 4248-368; VI 1995 Ill. H.J. 6279-398).
40. Id. at 195. Public Act 89-21 amended twenty-one different acts, some extensively and
others in minor respects. The amended acts include the State Employees Group Insurance Act of
1971 (5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1 et seq. (West 1996)), the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/1-101 et seq. (West 1996)), the Illinois Act on the Aging (20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/1 et
seq. (West 1996)), the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois (20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/64 et seq.
(West 1996)), the Children and Family Services Act (20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq. (West
1996)), the Disabled Persons Rehabilitation Act (20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2405/0.01 et seq. (West
1996)), the State Finance Act (30 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/1 et seq. (West 1996)), the State Prompt
Payment Act (30 ILL. COMP. STAT. 540/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)), the Illinois Income Tax Act
(35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/101 et seq. (West 1996)), the State Mandates Act (30 ILL. COMP. STAT.
805/1 et seq. (West 1996)), the School Code (105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1996)),
the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/1-101 et seq. (West 1996)), the Child Care Act of
1969 (225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 et seq. (West 1996)), the Riverboat Gambling Act (230 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 10/1 et seq. (West 1996)), the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 100/1-1 et seq. (West 1996)), the Illinois Public Aid Code (305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1 et
seq. (West 1996)), the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 et
seq. (West 1996)), the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-1 et seq. (West
1996)), the Adoption Act (750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)), the Probate Act of
1975 (755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1996)), and the Unemployment Insurance Act
(820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/100 et seq. (West 1996)). An Act Concerning State Services, P.A.
89-21, 1995 I11.Laws 21. Public Act 89-21 also repealed the Tobacco Products Tax Act (1995
Ill. Laws 731) and replaced it with the Tobacco Products Tax Act of 1995 (1995 I11.Laws 726).
FY1996 Budget Implementation Act, P.A. 89-21, 1995 I11.Laws 21.
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natural and logical connection to a single subject." 4 1 The court
reasoned:
Our review of the Act's provisions persuades us that the entire Act is
directed toward changing the substantive law in order to implement
the state's budget for the 1996 fiscal year. The legislature made these
changes to ensure that expenditures in a program did not exceed
appropriations for that program for the fiscal year. Therefore, all
matters included within Public Act 89-21 have a natural and logical
connection to implementation of the state's budget for the 19964 2fiscal
year. The Act thus comports with the [S]ingle [S]ubject [R]ule.
In Arangold, the court explained its process for applying the Single
Subject Rule: "the proper test for determining a single subject violation
is whether the matters included within the enactment have a natural and
logical connection to a single subject."4 3 Indeed, the court specifically
declared that it "has never held that the [S]ingle [S]ubject [R]ule
imposes a second and additional requirement that the provisions within
44
an enactment be related to each other."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Freeman took a different approach,
stating: "the [S]ingle [S]ubject [R]ule analysis employed by the court is
already two-tiered. 4 5 First:
A court should look to see whether an act, on its face, involves a
legitimate single subject. In carrying out this portion of the [S]ingle
[S]ubject [R]ule analysis, the court has considered, for example,
whether the stated subject of an act is so broad as to frustrate the very
purpose of the single subject clause .... 46
Second, the court conducts a "separate inquiry of whether the various
provisions within an act all relate to the proper subject at issue. This is
what has been meant by the requirement that an act's provisions have 'a
47
natural or logical connection,' or 'a legitimate relation to each other.'
Justice Freeman's two-tiered approach is a more nuanced approach
than the "I know it when I see it" method advocated by the majority's
"natural and logical connection" language because it establishes a basis
of measurement. Absence of the first step identified by Justice Freeman
begs the question: natural and logical connection to what? The first step
answers that question by establishing the baseline-the legitimate single

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Arangold, 718 N.E.2d at 198.
Id.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 203 (Freeman, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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subject of the bill. Each element of the bill is then measured for its
legitimate relationship to that subject.
C. The CurrentState of the Single Subject Rule
That is not to say, however, that either the majority or Justice
Freeman's opinion was correct.
In fact, both tests improperly
recognized implementation of the state's budget as an appropriate
subject for a substantive bill.
Indeed, article IV, section 8(d)
specifically provides that appropriations bills are exempt from the
Single Subject Rule. 4 8 It defies long-standing rules of statutory
construction that the constitution would specifically exempt the
appropriations portion of the state budget from the rule while at the
same time implicitly exempting the substantive bills of that same budget
from the rule. The delegates to the 1970 Constitutional Convention
could have exempted budget related matters from the Single Subject
Rule, but chose to do so only with appropriations bills and not
substantive bills.
Instead, the court should have ruled that the subject was closer to the
"public safety" category addressed in Johnson or the "governmental
matters" discussed in Reedy. At first glance, and setting aside the fact
that the legislation in Arangold contained many more provisions than
either of the bills invalidated in Johnson and Reedy, the subject appears
to be a legitimate single subject-substantive changes necessary to
implement the state's budget. In practice, however, the subject is so
vague and open-ended that it could include virtually anything. The
court's decision thus had the effect of defanging the rule only a few
years after it had first flashed its teeth.
The Single Subject Rule is effective only when it is properly
enforced.
However, courts have virtually stopped invalidating
legislation under the Rule. As a result, the legislature is free to become
increasingly bold about expanding the scope of legislation, particularly
in these budget implementation bills. After Arangold, rather than deal
with important but unpopular, controversial, or divisive ideas as
individual bills, the legislature can simply bury them in budget
implementation bills where they will be submerged with the many other
provisions. The fact that the budget implementation bills tend to arise
late in the legislative session, when there are so many things happening,
only heightens that incentive.

48. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d).
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Instead of measuring only whether each element of a bill is related to
the overall subject, the court should add a third step to determine
whether the provisions have any rational relationship to one another.
This way, the rule would be reinvigorated and again serve as an
effective restraint on legislative abuses. At the same time, however, this
test would not unduly constrict the legislature. Instead of rolling every
budget related item into one enormous bill, the legislature could satisfy
this standard by passing several smaller budget implementation bills,
one related to health care, another for human services, one for criminal
justice, and so on. This would strike a balance between the legislature's
need for flexibility and the importance of having a Single Subject Rule
with teeth.
In short, using the Single Subject Rule to challenge legislation
remains the most effective method available under article IV.
Moreover, it is easy to determine whether any particular bill is
susceptible to a single subject challenge. One need only review the
legislation and determine how many separate laws are being amended
(as opposed to how long the bill is or how many different articles it may
contain). Obviously, the more laws a particular bill amends, the less
likely it is that they are joined by a common theme or purpose.
II. THE THREE READINGS REQUIREMENT: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING
No discussion of litigation under article IV would be complete
without reference to the section 8(d) provision that: "[a] bill shall be
read by title on three different days in each house." 49 The purpose of
the requirement is to prevent last minute legislation that deprives both
legislators and the public of adequate notice of pending legislation and
an opportunity to review it prior to passage. 50 The "three-readings
requirement" must, however, be read in conjunction with two other
constitutional provisions that should have the effect of rendering the
three readings requirement almost unenforceable. However, because
every major challenge to bills passed by the General Assembly has
raised the three readings requirement, it warrants some discussion here.
First, article IV, section 6(d) provides that each chamber of the
General Assembly is empowered to determine the rules of its
proceedings. 51 Second, the last paragraph of section 8(d) of article IV
provides: "[t]he Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
49. Id.
50. See Giebelhausen v. Daley, 95 N.E.2d 84, 95 (1I1.1950) (discussing the three readings
requirement under a previous Illinois constitution).
51. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 6(d).
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President of the Senate shall sign each bill that passes both houses to
52
certify that the procedural requirements for passage have been met."
This is commonly known as the "enrolled bill rule."
Although the constitution mandates that each bill be read by title on
three separate days, the gaping hole in this provision is the lack of any
requirement that the title of the bill be the same on each of those three
days. Coupled with the General Assembly's power to dictate the rules
of its proceedings, it is possible, and indeed fairly common, for a bill to
have one title and corresponding provisions for four of the six
constitutionally mandated readings (three in the House and three in the
Senate), and have a different title and provisions for the final two
readings, which could both occur on the same day. 5 3 In other words,
despite the three readings requirement, the procedural rules adopted by
the legislature permit a change in the title of the bill at any point in the
process without restarting the three readings clock.
The enrolled bill rule provides that whenever legislation has been
certified by the presiding officers of both houses as having been passed
in compliance with all the procedural rules, a court will not look beyond
that certification to conduct an independent examination. 54 In other
words, certification by the presiding officers creates an irrefutable
presumption that all of the procedural requirements have been satisfied,
including the three readings requirement. 55 The Illinois Supreme Court
has interpreted the enrolled bill rule language in article IV, section 8(d)
to mean that the signatures of the presiding officers of both houses
constitute conclusive proof that all constitutionally required procedures
have been followed in the enactment of the bill. 56 The Committee on
the Legislature at the 1970 Constitutional Convention specifically
52. Id. § 8(d).
53. Cf. Orr v. Edgar, 698 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (noting that "[a]fter a brief floor
debate on January 7, 1997, the bill was read one time in both houses and passed along partisan

lines that same day").
54. 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS,

SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
COMMITTEE PROPOSALS, MEMBER PROPOSALS 1386-87 (1969-1970) [hereinafter "6 RECORD
OF PROCEEDINGS"]. Other states adopt a "modified enrolled bill rule" that allows examination of

any provision requiring an entry in the legislature's journal, cf. Barnsdall Refining Corp. v.
Welsh, 269 N.W.2d 853 (S.D. 1936); Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass'n v. South Dakota, 346 N.W.2d
737 (S.D. 1984), or an "extrinsic evidence rule," where courts will consider evidence beyond the
legislative journal. See D & W Auto Supply v. Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1980).
55. Benjamin v. Devon Bank, 368 N.E.2d 878, 880 (I11.1977).

56. Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago, 311 N.E.2d 116, 119 (111.1974) ("Whether or not a bill
has been read by title, as the Constitution commands, seems fairly to be characterized as a
procedural matter, the determination of which was deliberately left to the presiding officers of the

two Houses of the General Assembly."); see also Polich v. Chicago Sch. Fin. Auth., 402 N.E.2d
247, 257 (Ill.
1980).
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recommended that the enrolled bill rule be adopted in the 1970
Constitution to replace the former "journal entry rule" that allowed
legislation to be challenged in the5 7courts by pointing to a defect in its
passage as reflected in the journal.

In a series of cases decided in the 1990s, the Illinois Supreme Court
continued to recognize the enrolled bill rule and its prohibition on
judicial review of the procedural aspects of legislation. The first of
these cases was Geja's Cafd v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition
Authority,58 where the court considered a challenge to legislation
imposing a restaurant tax for the purpose of financing construction at
Chicago's convention center. 5 9 The court recognized that the framers of
the 1970 Constitution intended60 to avoid judicial nullification of statutes
on purely procedural grounds.
The court went on to conclude, however, that "the General Assembly

has shown remarkably poor self-discipline in policing itself. Indeed,
both parties agree that ignoring the three-readings requirement has
become a procedural regularity." 6 1 The court upheld the legislation
despite its concerns, concluding that separation of powers was an
overriding concern, but in doing so, the court fired a shot across the
legislature's bow: "If the General Assembly continues its poor record of
policing itself, we reserve the right to revisit this issue on another day to
decide the continued propriety of ignoring this constitutional
57. See 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 54, at 1386-87; see also Benjamin, 368
N.E.2d at 879-81. Under the former journal entry rule, amendments to bills did not need to be
read on three separate days in each house so long as the amendment was "germane" to the general
subject matter of the original bill. People ex rel. County Collector of Cook County v. Jeri, Ltd.,
239 N.E.2d 777, 779 (I11.1968).
58. 606N.E.2d 1212 (111.1992).
59. Id. at 1215.
60. Id. at 1221. The court noted:
Presently Illinois has the "journal entry" rule as distinguished from an "enrolled bill"
rule. It is proposed that Illinois adopt the "enrolled bill" rule. The "journal entry" rule
means that a piece of legislation can be challenged in the courts by pointing to a defect
in its passage as reflected in the journal. Under this rule, a statute dually [sic] passed
by the General Assembly and signed by the Governor may be attacked in the courts,
not necessarily on its merits, but on some procedural error or technicality found in the
legislative process. The "journal entry" rule, as a result, leads to complex litigation
over procedures and technicalities. The "enrolled bill" rule would provide that when
the presiding officers of the two houses sign a bill, their signatures become conclusive
proof that all constitutional procedures have been properly followed. The "enrolled
bill" rule would not permit a challenge to a bill on procedural or technical grounds
regarding the manner of passage if the bill showed on its face that it was properly
passed. Signatures by the presiding officers would, of course, constitute proof that
proper procedures were followed.
Id. (quoting 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 54, at 1386-87).
61. Id.
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violation." 6 2 The Supreme Court has subsequently addressed the three
readings requirement, but has simply restated the enrolled bill rule
without the saber rattling present in Geja's Caf. 6 3
The three readings requirement is virtually useless; but only because
the Constitutional Convention deliberately decided to make it so. In
Geja's Cafj, the Illinois Supreme Court effectively threatened to ignore
the enrolled bill doctrine and invalidate legislation passed in violation of
the three readings requirement. However, judicial saber rattling is not
the answer. In the end, the court properly restrained itself. In fact, the
court lacks the authority to "enforce" the three readings requirement. If
the court were to ever rule that any bill was invalid for violating the
three readings requirement, the court would have to ignore the
Constitutional Convention's deliberate choice of the enrolled bill64 rule,
which is tantamount to declaring the constitution unconstitutional.
Constitutional challenges to legislation passed by the General
Assembly often claim a violation of the three readings requirement, and
very often those challenges are correct-the rule was technically
violated. Nonetheless, practitioners should note that these claims
should be omitted from constitutional attacks on legislation because
their inclusion betrays that the party bringing the challenge does not

62. Id.
63. Cutinello v. Whitley, 641 N.E.2d 360 (Il. 1994); People v. Dunigan, 650 N.E.2d 1026 (I1.
1995); Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman, 691 N.E.2d 374 (Il1. 1998). However, a spirited
attack of the enrolled bill rule did come out in Orr v. Edgar, where Judge Zwick dissented from
the court's decision regarding the constitutionality of an election law forbidding a voter from
casting a single vote for all candidates of a political party. Judge Zwick lambasted the General
Assembly in his dissent:
We are confronted with a case in which it is undisputed that the speaker of the House
and the president of the Senate deliberately and shamelessly falsified their
certifications regarding passage of the Act knowing that the bill was fundamentally
defective. As the majority has observed, this act had been introduced for the first time
on the very last day of the legislative session. At this point in time, section 8(d) made
the enactment of newly introduced legislation constitutionally impossible. It should be
noted that the very next day, indeed, the very next hour, the opposite political party
took majority control of the House of Representatives. The deliberate falsification of
the certifications required by section 8(d) to achieve passage of a defective bill that
would have otherwise lapsed is unprecedented. Certainly our supreme court never
intended to give its judicial imprimatur to such extraordinary and reprehensible
conduct by its application of the enrolled bill doctrine, and never before has this
doctrine been used to shield such patent dishonesty.
Orr v. Edgar, 698 N.E.2d 560, 573 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (Zwick, J., dissenting).
64. Interestingly, two Illinois Appellate Courts have incorrectly ruled that the three readings
requirement could be suspended by a majority of the members of General Assembly pursuant to
its rules. People v. Gray, 549 N.E.2d 730, 739 (111.App. Ct. 1989); People v. Cannady, 513
N.E.2d 118, 120 (i1. App. Ct. 1987). The General Assembly does not have the authority to
suspend the Constitution.
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fully comprehend the enrolled bill rule and its effect. Thus, the
inclusion of a three readings claim is likely to raise suspicion, if not
skepticism, regarding other challenges, such as the Single Subject Rule,
no matter how meritorious they may be.
III. COMPLETE SECTIONS & AMENDMENT By REFERENCE OR
IMPLICATION

The Complete Section Provision of article IV, section 8(d), like the
Single Subject Rule, is a notice provision designed to educate both
legislators and the public about the contents of legislation. The section
provides: "A bill expressly amending a law shall set forth completely
the sections amended. '65 The Constitutional Convention's Committee
on the Legislature explained the purpose and intent of this language:
The prohibition of "amendment by reference" is designed to prevent
an act from being amended simply by referring to it. For example, the
"amendment by reference" provision prevents an act from being
amended through adding or subtracting language if the relevant
portions of the act to be amended are not set forth. Addition of or
subtraction of a "not" within a sentence of a law could drastically alter
the effect of the law; hence, the need66exists to clearly show on the
record exactly what is being amended.
The Illinois Supreme Court first considered the "amendment by
reference" prohibition of this section in Fuehrmeyer v. City of
Chicago,67 where the court invalidated legislation that did not set forth
completely the sections amended. The bill in question provided for the
exclusive exercise by the state of the power to regulate certain
professions, vocations and occupations. However, it only referred by
name to the thirty other acts that it was amending, without explicitly
amending those statutes. 68 The court concluded that: "[n]owhere does
Public Act 77-1818 set forth the relevant provisions of any of the 30
69
acts to which it makes reference. It simply recites their titles."
70
Consequently, the legislation was invalidated.
Following Fuehrmeyer, the General Assembly again attempted to
provide for the exclusive regulation by the state of the private detective
business, but this time it did so by amending the Private Detective Act
to include a new section providing: "Pursuant to paragraph (h) of
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d).
6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 54, at 1387-88.
311 N.E.2d 116 (Il. 1974).
Id. at 117-18.
Id. at 120.
Id.
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section 6 of article VII of the Constitution of 1970 the power to regulate
the private Detective Business shall be exercised exclusively by the
State and may not be exercised
by any unit of local government,
71
including home rule units."
The constitutionality of that Act was challenged in United Private
Detective & Security Assoc. v. City of Chicago,72 where the plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the Act for its failure to repeal
another statute authorizing municipalities to license and regulate
detectives concurrently with the state.7 3 Although the bill did not
expressly amend or repeal the relevant section of the other statute, the
court held that the other statute was repealed by implication, not by
reference, and therefore was constitutional.7 4 The court did not explain
its distinction in terms of policy, but merely stated:
Public Act 78-1232 repeals by implication that section of the
Municipal Code which authorizes municipal regulation of private
detectives concurrently with that by the State. An act which is
complete in itself and which only by implication repeals a prior
statue
75
does not violate section 8(d) of article IV of the Constitution.
Subsequently, the First District Appellate Court considered the
constitutionality of legislation mandating that certified nurses' salaries
be raised to the level of certified teachers' salaries. 76 However, the bill
did not appropriate any state funds to support the increased salaries that
would be borne by local municipalities. 77 This conflicted with the State
Mandates Act, which requires the state to reimburse local governments
78
for the cost of programs that are mandated by state legislation.
Instead of specifically amending the State Mandates Act to exempt or
exclude the nurses' pay increase from its application, the General
Assembly simply included a statement of legislative intent within the
Nurses' Pay Bill that only made reference to the Mandates Act: "The
General Assembly hereby finds and declares that this amendatory Act
does not require reimbursement by the State under the 'State Mandates
79
Act.'

71.
72.

P.A. 78-1232 (1974).
343 N.E.2d 453 (Ill. 1976).

73. Id. at 458.
74. Id. at 459.
75. Id. (citation omitted).
76. Bd. of Educ. of Maine Twp. High Sch. Dist. 207 v. State Bd. of Educ., 487 N.E.2d 1053
(111. App. Ct. 1985).

77. Id. at 1056.
78. Id. at 1055.
79. Id. at 1056.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

The court declined to apply the implied amendment doctrine because
it found that the General Assembly was well aware of the effect of the
Mandates Act, and therefore that this was not a case of inadvertently
enacting a bill that conflicted with prior legislation.8810 It also noted that
"Illinois courts do not favor implied amendments."
Finally, in Granberg v. Didrickson,82 the First District Appellate
Court again invalidated a bill on the grounds that it violated the
"amendment by reference" provision of the Illinois Constitution. In that
case, the legislature appropriated $15,792,000 to the Department of
Transportation, an amount in excess of that permitted by the State
Finance Act. 83 The state argued that by exceeding the cap imposed by
the State Finance Act, the legislature amended the State Finance Act by
implication. The court found that the legislation was an improper
amendment by reference and not an amendment by implication, stating:
"Here, . . .the General Assembly was aware of the infirmities in the
contested appropriation, but chose not to amend or repeal the State
Finance Act. The doctrine of amendment by implication does not
84
apply."
Granbergpresented essentially the same issue that had been decided
by the United States Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill.8 5 Congress began appropriating money to the TVA in 1967 to
construct a dam along the Little Tennessee River for the purpose of
stimulating development and generating enough power to heat 20,000
homes.86 The massive project would cost tens of millions of dollars.87
Midway through construction, however, a University of Tennessee
ichthyologist 8 8 discovered a previously unknown species of perch called
a snail darter ("a three inch, tannish colored fish"), which caused the
Secretary of the Interior to use his powers under the Endangered
Species Act to halt the nearly completed project in order to ensure that
the dam would not "result in the destruction or modification of habitat
of [an endangered or threatened] species." 89 In the predictable ensuing

80. Id. at 1058.
81. Id.
82. 665 N.E.2d 398 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996).
83. Id. at 400.
84. Id.at 403.
85. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
86. Id. at 157.
87. Id. at 158.
88. Ichthyology is "the branch of zoology dealing with fishes, their structure, classification,
and life history." WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 668 (3d. College ed., 1988).
89. Hill, 437 U.S. at 158.
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litigation, the Court rejected the TVA's argument that Congress
repealed by implication the applicable portion of the Endangered
Species Act by continuing to appropriate money for the dam, and
upheld the Secretary's actions. 90 It concluded that "the doctrine
disfavoring repeals by implication 'applies with full vigor when... the
subsequent legislation is an appropriations measure."' 9 1 Congress
eventually mandated the completion of the dam,92 and9 3the snail darter
apparently thrives in other parts of the Tennessee River.
Each year, the Illinois General Assembly passes hundreds of bills
into law, many of which impact the enforcement of other, pre-existing
laws. Often, as in Granberg, the resulting mishmash results in
While each General
inconsistent or even contradictory statutes.
Assembly is free to pass any bill and is not bound by the actions of
previous General Assemblies, it must, like any other entity, follow the
law. If a bill passed by the General Assembly and signed by the
governor is inconsistent with or conflicts with a pre-existing law, it
must amend that pre-existing law to eliminate the conflict. If it does
not, either through neglect or deliberate omission, the conflict can be a
fertile field in which those seeking to invalidate the law can plow.
Challenges on the Complete Section Provision are, however,
somewhat more difficult to find than a Single Subject challenge. While
the existence of a Single Subject challenge can generally be gleaned
from even a cursory review of legislation, a challenge based on the
failure to set forth all the impacted sections involves a detailed review
of not only the legislation but of all of the other statutes that may be
indirectly affected. While this can be a cumbersome task, the cases
referenced above demonstrate that it may be worthwhile for anyone
seeking to invalidate legislation.
IV. EFFECTIVE DATE OF LEGISLATION
As the above discussion demonstrates, nothing about the legislative
process is simple. Another example is the seemingly innocuous
question about when a bill passed by the General Assembly gains the
power of law. In answering that question, three distinct events come
into play. The first event is when the bill is "passed" by the General
Assembly, the second is when the bill becomes law, and the third is
when the bill becomes "effective." The effective date of a bill may or
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 190.
Id.
Energy and Water Development Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437 (1979).
ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIc LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 848 (2d ed. 2002).
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may not be same date as when it becomes law, which in turn may or
may not be the same date the bill passed. The Illinois Constitution
provides in article IV, section 10:
The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform effective
date for laws passed prior to June 1 of a calendar year. The General
Assembly may provide for a different effective date in any law passed
prior to June 1 of the next calendar year unless the General Assembly
by the vote of three-fifths of the 94
members elected to each house
provides for an earlier effective date.
The effective date of a bill may be stated expressly in the bill as a
date certain (e.g., July 1, 2009) or a measured date (e.g., 90 days after
becoming law). Different sections of the same bill may also have
different effective dates. A bill may also provide that it becomes
effective immediately upon becoming law. If a bill has no express
effective date, the effective date is determined pursuant to the Effective
Date of Laws Act. 9 5 Bills passed on May 31 or earlier are effective
January 1 of the next year,96 and those passed
on or after June 1
97
become effective June 1 of the following year.
Why is this so complicated? The framers of the Illinois Constitution
deliberately established the General Assembly as a part-time body.
However, rather than mandate a specific adjournment date, the framers
incented the General Assembly to conclude its business efficiently by
making it more difficult, through the super-majority requirement of
section 10, to pass legislation after May 31 that would become
immediately effective. 9 8 The effect of this clause is that legislation that
receives only a majority vote after May 31 cannot become effective
until one year later. As a result, the General Assembly might as well
wait and pass the same bill during its next session because the effective
date will be the same.
What does it mean for a bill to be "passed" by the General
Assembly? Section 3 of the Effective Date of Laws Act provides that a
bill is passed at the time of its final legislative action prior to
presentation to the governor. 99 As a general rule, a bill is "passed" on
the date when the second house of the General Assembly approves the
bill in its final form. Thus, if the governor signs the bill without any
form of a veto, or if the bill becomes law because of the governor's
94. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
95. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/1 et seq. (2006).
96. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/1(a).
97. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/2 (2006).
98. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
99. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/3 (2006).
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inaction, the date the bill is passed is the date (1) when the second house
approves the bill without amendment; (2) when the house of origin
concurs in all of the second house's amendments; (3) when the second
when a conference
house recedes from all of its amendments; or (4)
10 0
committee report is adopted by the second house.
While this appears straightforward, it becomes particuarly
If the General
complicated when the governor vetoes the bill.
Assembly overrides a veto or restores an item reduction, the passage
date relates back to the time when the General Assembly first approved
the bill, because that was the time it was first approved in its final
form.10 1 However, if the General Assembly accepts an amendatory
veto, the bill is "passed" when both houses vote to accept the
amendatory veto because this is the first time the General Assembly has
approved the bill in its final form-there is no relation back to the date
Whether the
the General Assembly first approved the bill. 10 2
amendatory veto is technical03or substantive, the bill is "passed" upon
acceptance of such changes. 1
This circumstance arose in Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port
District,1 4 where the Illinois Supreme Court considered the effective
date of a bill subject to an amendatory veto. In 1982 and 1983, local
officials had considered developing an airport on the port district's
property and had begun to take the necessary steps to approve its
construction. 10 5 In the meantime, the General Assembly passed a bill
providing that the airport could not be constructed unless approved by a
popular referendum. 10 6 The Governor issued an amndatory veto and the
issue was whether the legislation had become effective in time to halt
the airport proposal. 10 7 The court noted that the issue of effective dates
had been "subject to much debate" but ultimately concluded that the bill
was not effective until the General Assembly accepted the Governor's
recommended changes. 10 8 The court reasoned:
The consideration of an amendatorily vetoed bill by the General
Assembly obviously requires additional legislative action because the
100. Mulligan v. Joliet Reg'l Port Dist., 527 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ill. 1988).
101. City of Springfield v. Allphin, 384 N.E.2d 310, 316 (Ill. 1978); see also 1975 111.Op.
Att'y Gen. 77 (1975).
102. People ex rel. Klingler v. Howlett, 278 N.E.2d 84, 87 (Ill. 1972) (citing Bd. of Educ. v.
Morgan, 147 N.E. 34, 36 (Il. 1925)); see also 1974 Ill. Op. Att'y Gen. 119 (1974).
103. People v. Schumpert, 533 N.E.2d 1106, 1111 (Il. 1989).
104. Mulligan, 527 N.E.2d 1264.
105. Id. at 1266.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1268.
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original language of the bill is no longer intact. A bill changed upon
the Governor's specific recommendation is no longer the same bill as
initially "passed" by the General Assembly and the "final legislative
action" would not simply be a reaffirmation of the bill's original
language as in the situation involving an override of a nonamendatorily vetoed bill. Thus, in an amendatory veto situation, a bill
can only be viewed as "passed" when the legislature has voted to
accept the Governor's recommendations for change. Only then is the
bill in its final form and can the public
be held to have been put on
10 9
notice as to the bill's actual contents.
In short, when the General Assembly overrides the governor, the
effective date relates back to the original passage, but if the General
Assembly accepts the governor's changes, the effective date is when the
changes are accepted. When the General Assembly overrides a veto,
then the language of the bill was in its final form on the date of initial
approval by the General Assembly. But if the General Assembly
accepts an amendatory veto, the bill was not in its final form until the
acceptance of the changes. It would make no sense to declare such a
bill "passed" upon its initial approval by the legislature because the bill
110
was not in its final form.
While the effective date of a bill subject to an amendatory veto is
pretty well settled, a more interesting question has yet to be considered.
If a bill is passed after May 31, and it provides for an effective date
earlier than June 1 of the following calendar year, it must pass both
1
houses by a three-fifths vote for the stated effective date to apply.' '
This leads to the question of what happens when a bill that provides for
an immediate effective date is approved by both houses of the General
Assembly prior to June 1 but is amendatorily vetoed by the governor
and the General Assembly accepts the governor's changes after June 1
with a majority, but not a super-majority, vote.
This situation highlights two potentially conflicting constitutional
provisions. First, article IV, section 9(d) provides that the governor's
"specific recommendations may be accepted by a record vote of a
majority of the members elected to each house."1 12 Thus, a simple
majority is all it takes to accept an amendatory veto. On the other hand,
the effective date provision establishes that the bill will be "passed"
only upon acceptance of the governor's changes after June 1. As a

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1270-71 (citing City of Springfield v. Allphin, 384 N.E.2d 310 (Ill.
1978)).
See id. at 1268 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Morgan, 147 N.E. 34 (111. 1925)).
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
Id. § 9(d).
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result, it appears that such an acceptance would require a super-majority
three-fifths vote.
While this potential conflict has never been judicially resolved, such
a circumstance should require a super-majority vote to accept the
governor's amendatory veto. A bill sent to the governor prior to June 1
that is subsequently amendatorily vetoed would not assume its final
form until after the super-majority requirement became operative.
Application of the simple majority vote requirement in such a
circumstance would have the effect of permitting the General Assembly
and the govneror to avoid the super-majority requirement by clever use
of the amendatory veto. For example, the General Assembly could pass
a bill with no effective date that had the support of a majority, but not a
three-fifths majority, after June 1, but it would not become effective
until June 1 of the following year. If the governor were to use his
amendatory veto to insert an immediate effective date, then the General
Assembly could avoid the heightened vote requirement and still have an
immediately effective bill. The constitution should not permit such
slight of hand.
That is not to say that such a bill is necessarily ripe for constitutional
challenge. Attacking a bill under these circumstances (passage prior to
June 1, acceptance of an amendatory veto by less than three-fifths after
June 1) is essentially a challenge that the bill did not receive a sufficient
number of votes (had the amendatory veto been accepted by a threefifths majority the bill would certainly be properly "passed"). No court
has addressed whether a bill that received the requisite number of votes
is subject to the enrolled bill rule, and so it remains an open question.
On one hand, the enrolled bill rule insulates the General Assembly
from challenge to its procedures in passing bills, as opposed to
substantive provisions like the Single Subject Rule. The question of
whether a bill received the requisite number of votes certainly appears
to be more procedural than substantive. On the other hand, application
of the enrolled bill rule to a question as basic and fundamental as
whether the bill passed could lead to abuses and chicanery. 113 The
correct answer is probably that whether a bill received a sufficient
number of votes is a procedural requirement that ought be subject to the
enrolled bill rule. While this may lead to abuse and even chicanery, the
proper remedy is the voters, not judges. The constitutional framers
decided that the legislature was answerable to the voters, and any
abuses of the constitution's procedural requirements could be taken up

113.

See Orr v. Edgar, 698 N.E.2d 560, 573 (I11. App. Ct. 1998) (Zwick, J., dissenting).
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at the ballot box at the next election. That should be incentive enough
for the legislature.
V. SPECIAL LEGISLATION

Article IV, section 13 of the Illinois Constitution provides: "The
General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law
is or can be made applicable." 114 In other words, the General Assembly
may not confer a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a
group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated. 115 The
special legislation provision does not prohibit all legislative
classifications; instead it is designed to prevent only those
classifications that are arbitrary. 1 16 Significantly, the constitution goes
on to provide that "[w]hether a general law is or can be made applicable
shall be a matter for judicial determination." 117 In making that
determination, however, classifications drawn by the General Assembly
enjoy a presumption of constitutional validity, and any doubts are to be
1 18
resolved in favor of upholding them.
Unlike the Single Subject Rule or the Three Readings Requirement,
which impose procedural restrictions on the General Assembly, the
Special Legislation prohibition imposes the most significant substantive
restriction on the General Assembly's lawmaking powers.
This
restriction dates back to the Constitutional Convention of 1870, which
recognized:
Governments were not made to make the 'rich richer and the poor
poorer,' nor to advance the interest of the few against the many; but
that the weak might be protected from the will of the strong; that the
poor might enjoy the same rights with the rich; that one species of
property might be as free as another-that one class or interest should
not flourish by the
aid of government, whilst another is oppressed with
119
all the burdens.
Constitutional challenges to a statute on special legislation grounds
often coincide with challenges on equal protection grounds. 120 The
equal protection guarantee of the Illinois Constitution also seeks to
114. ILL. CONST. art. IV,§ 13.

115. Cutinello v. Whitley, 641 N.E.2d 360, 363 (111.1994).
116. In re Vernon Hills, 658 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ill. 1995); Nevitt v. Langfelder, 623 N.E.2d
281,285 (Ill. 1993).
117. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
118. Vernon Hills, 658 N.E.2d at 367.
119. I DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1870 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS 578 (remarks of Delegate Anderson).

120. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.").
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prevent classifications on the basis of unjustified criteria. 12 1 However,
the special legislation and equal protection provisions establish different
constitutional protections. The special legislation provision prohibits
classification in favor of a select group without a reasonable basis. In
contrast, the Equal Protection Clause protects against "arbitrary and
invidious discrimination that results when government withholds from a
person or a class of persons a right, benefit or privilege without a
reasonable basis for the governmental action." 122 In other words, the
Equal Protection Clause ensures that a person or class of people is not
deprived of a right granted to others, while the prohibition against
special legislation ensures that the state does not unjustly confer a
benefit on a person or class of people.
The standards governing special legislation and equal protection
challenges under the Illinois Constitution are generally the same as
those governing claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution. 12 3 Thus, where the legislation affects neither a
fundamental right nor implicates a suspect class, the appropriate level of
scrutiny for a special legislation challenge is the rational basis testwhether the statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate
124
state interest.
The Illinois Supreme Court has established a "two-prong" rational
basis test for special legislation challenges. 125 Statutory classifications
will withstand a special legislation challenge only if: (1) they are
founded upon a rational difference of situation or condition existing in
the persons or objects upon which the classification rests, and (2) there
is a rational and proper basis for the classification in view of the objects
126
and purposes to be accomplished.
The court has been most willing to strike down legislation when the
classification confers a special benefit or privilege to some local
governments based upon geographic or population measures. While a
legislative classification "is not local or special merely because [it is]
based upon population,"' 12 7 such classifications are often the basis for
challenge. For example, in In re Belmont Fire ProtectionDistrict, the
court invalidated legislation permitting the transfer of territory between
fire districts within counties having a population between 600,000 and
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Nevitt, 623 N.E.2d at 285.
Chi. Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1245, 1250 (111. 1985).
Nevitt, 623 N.E.2d at 284-85. See also U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
Nevitt, 623 N.E.2d at 285.
See, e.g., In re Belmont Fire Prot. Dist., 489 N.E.2d 1385, 1388 (111.1986).
Id.; see also In re Vernon Hills, 658 N.E.2d 365, 368 (111.1995).
People ex rel. Du Page v. Smith, 173 N.E.2d 485, 489 (111.1961).
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1,000,000 persons (which at the time was only DuPage County). 12 8 It
concluded that the legislation was impermissible special legislation
because there was no rational reason why a municipality served by
multiple fire protection districts in a county with the specified
population can be said to differ from a municipality served by multiple
fire protection districts in a county with a population less than 600,000
or more than 1,000,000. The court reasoned that "[i]f a real need exists
to eliminate the alleged disadvantages and dangers of multiple fire
protection districts serving one municipality, then the same need to
remedy this evil also exists in other counties as well, regardless of the
29
level of the population of the county." 1
This does not mean, however, that all geographic or population
classifications are impermissible special legislation.
In Chicago
National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, the legislature had
amended the Illinois Environmental Protection Act to, in effect, prohibit
night games at Wrigley Field. 130 Because Wrigley Field was the only
ballpark in the state affected by the legislation, the Cubs alleged that the
legislation was impermissible special legislation. 13 1 The court found it
reasonable for the General Assembly to distinguish between stadiums in
cities with more than one million inhabitants and those with fewer than
one million inhabitants, because the noise from a nighttime sporting
event would affect more people in an urban area. 132 Parking and traffic
problems would also be more pronounced around stadiums in larger
urban areas. 133 The court also found that the same considerations
applied to the distinction between daytime and nighttime sporting
events. 134 Finally, amateur athletics were found to have generally
shorter seasons and attract fewer spectators. 13 5 Because a rational basis
could be found for each classification, the court upheld the
13 6
legislation.
Similarly, in Cutinello v. Whitley, the court upheld a classification
that allowed DuPage, Kane, and McHenry Counties to impose a motor
128. Belmont, 489 N.E.2d at 1391.
129. Id. at 1389; see also Vernon Hills, 658 N.E.2d at 369-71 (striking down a statute limited
in application to only those counties with populations of between 500,000 and 750,000, which, at
the time, made the legislation applicable only to Lake County, by the application of the "twoprong test" and same reasoning from Belmont).
130. Chi. Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ill. 1985).
131. Id. at 1249.
132. Id. at 1251.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.at 1251-52.
136. Id.at 1252.
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fuel tax. 137 For the court, statistical evidence showing that those three
counties were the three fastest growing counties in the state satisfied the
first prong. 13 8
The court also found that a greater need for
transportation financing in those three counties than in other areas of the
state satisfied the second prong. 139 The legislation was, therefore,
rationally related to the state's purpose of providing fast-growing
counties with a method to raise the funds needed
to expand and
140
maintain their burdened county highway systems.
Classifications that are not geographic or population based are
subject to the same examination, although the outcomes are less
predictable. Take for example, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, where
the court considered sweeping tort reform legislation imposing a
$500,000 limit on non-economic damages for injuries. 14 1 The court
recognized that "the hallmark of an unconstitutional classification is its
arbitrary application to similarly situated individuals without adequate
justification or connection to the purpose of the statute," 14 2 and
concluded that "the arbitrary and automatic cap on compensatory
damages for noneconomic injuries in only certain tort cases" was
contrary to bill's stated purpose to "reestablish the credibility of the tort
system."' 14 3 The court struck down the law as special legislation
because it was "unable to discern any connection between the automatic
reduction of one type of compensatory damages awarded to one class of
144
injured plaintiffs and a savings in the systemwide costs of litigation."'
On the other hand, in Nevitt v. Langfelder, the court upheld an
amendment to the Public Employee Disability Act that guaranteed a
minimum level of disability benefits to public employees involved in
law enforcement and fire protection, but exempted the City of Chicago
and Cook County based on their populations. 14 5 The court cited several
reasons why the legislature might rationally exclude Chicago and Cook
County from the application of the Act, including employee bargaining
strength and increased hazards facing employees in those units. 14 6 As a
result, the court determined that the legislation was rationally related to

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

641 N.E.2d 360, 367 (111.1994).
Id. at 365-66.
Id.
Id. at 366.
689 N.E.2d 1057, 1066 (I11.
1997).
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1077.
623 N.E.2d 281, 287, 291 (111.1993).
Id. at 286-87.
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the state's purpose of guaranteeing a minimum level of disability
benefits. 147
The legislation considered in Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority
immunized the Chicago Transit Authority, but not private carriers, from
tort liability for failure to protect passengers from the criminal acts of
third parties. 148 The court began by declaring that "[a] legislative
classification will be upheld if any set of facts can be reasonably
conceived which justify distinguishing the class to which the law
applies from the class to which the statute is inapplicable."' 149 The court
concluded that the CTA,
unlike private carriers, is a municipal corporation, relying heavily
upon the public treasury to subsidize the costs of public
transportation. The substantial involvement of taxpayers in
funding of public transportation provides a rational basis for
differentiating between the liability of governmental and private
carriers upon a failure to prevent criminal assaults on
passengers.150

Because of this rational basis for the classification, the court upheld
the legislation.151
These cases establish a mixed bag of results: some population based
classifications are stricken and some are upheld; other classifications are
While courts should take a
given similarly uneven treatment.
deferential approach to weighing legislative classifications, 152 the more
arbitrary the classification, the more likely that a court will find that it
lacks a rational relationship to a legitimate state policy conferring a
benefit on only one group. As a result, anytime the legislature confers a
benefit on one group to the exclusion of others, those excluded should
consider challenging the validity of the action as impermissible special
legislation.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
General

Id. at 287.
531 N.E.2d 1, 2 (I. 1988).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at7.
1995) ("Classifications drawn by the
See In re Vernon Hills, 658 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ill.
Assembly are always presumed to be constitutionally valid, and all doubts resolved in

favor of upholding them. The party who attacks the validity of a classification bears the burden
of establishing its arbitrariness.").
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VI. THE AMENDATORY VETO PROCESS

The Illinois Constitution empowers the governor to veto153 a bill in
three different ways: (1) total veto, (2) item or reduction veto, and (3)
amendatory veto. 154 As its name implies, a total veto negates an entire
bill unless the General Assembly overrides the veto by a three-fifths
vote in each house. 155 Item and reduction vetoes, on the other hand,
apply only to appropriations bills. 156 An "item veto" eliminates an item
of appropriation in a bill, whereas a "reduction veto" reduces the
amount of an item in an appropriations bill. An amendatory veto allows
a governor to make specific recommendations for changes to
substantive, as opposed to appropriations, bills. 157 However, the
governor's power regarding reduction and amendatory vetoes is limited,
and any actions that exceed that authority may present an opportunity to
challenge the ensuing enactment.
A. Reduction of Appropriations

Like forty-two other states, the Illinois Constitution empowers the
governor to eliminate or reduce an item contained in an appropriations
bill. 158 An appropriation item veto may be overridden in the same
manner as a vetoed bill (i.e., three-fifths vote in each house), but an item
reduced may be restored to the original amount by a simple majority
vote in each house. 159 The constitution provides that "[p]ortions of a
bill not reduced or vetoed shall become law" without further action by
the General Assembly. 160 The Attorney General has interpreted this to
mean that even in the case of a reduction veto, the amount remaining
after the reduction has the effect of law and is available to the recipient
of the appropriation. 161
153.

"Veto" is Latin for "I forbid." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

UNABRIDGED 2548 (1961).

154. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9. The governor has sixty days to either sign the bill into law or
exercise one of the three veto powers by returning the bill with his objections to the house in
which it originated. The failure of the governor to act in any way within sixty days results in the
bill becoming law as if the governor had approved and signed the bill. Id. § 9(b). Illinois has no
pocket veto.
155. Id. § 9(c).
156. Id. § 9(d).
157. Id. § 9(e).
158. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 93, at 760. Note that the federal Constitution does not
empower the President to make a reduction or "line-item" veto. Id. However, Congress did enact
the Line Item Veto Act, effective January 1, 1997, which granted Presidents line item veto
authority over appropriations, new direct spending, and certain tax benefits. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 1973 Il. Op. Att'y Gen. 158 (1973).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

The item or reduction veto is a dramatic tilting of power from the
legislature to the governor that was incorporated into many state
16 2
constitutions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
This provision empowers the governor to eliminate or reduce the
amount of money that has been appropriated from the treasury.
However, the governor cannot alter a condition or limitation of an
appropriation, such as the rate at which money may be drawn from
funds appropriated. 163 For example, when the governor attempted to
reduce the rate at which the Junior College Board could distribute
money to junior college districts, the Attorney General concluded that
the term "item" meant "a specified sum of money to be used for a
specific purpose."' 164 Applying that interpretation, the Attorney General
ruled that the distribution rate was not a "specified sum of money," and,
therefore, was not an "item of appropriation" within the meaning of the
constitution. 165 Accordingly, the governor's action was ineffective as a
16 6
reduction veto.
This interpretation is generally in line with those applied in other
states, where, as a general rule, the governor has wide authority to alter
or eliminate spending provisions from appropriations bills but no
authority to alter the substantive conditions attached to those
167
appropriations.
B. Amendatory Veto
The constitution also empowers the governor to propose substantive
changes to legislation passed by the General Assembly. Article IV,
section 9(e) provides:
The Governor may return a bill together with specific
recommendations for change to the house in which it originated. The
bill shall be considered in the same manner as a vetoed bill but the
specific recommendations may be accepted by a record vote of a
162. Luis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States' Item Veto Be Transferred

to the President?,75 GEO. L.J. 159, 178 (1986).
163. 1973 Ill. Op. Att'y Gen. 151 (1973).
164. Id. at 153 (citing People ex rel. State Bd. of Agric. v. Brady, 115 N.E. 204, 207 (Ill.
1917)).
165. Id. at 154-55.
166. Id. at 158.
167. Cf Wisconsin ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 264 N.W.2d 539, 550-51 (Wis. 1978) (finding
that the governor could reduce the amount in a spending bill so long as the remainder was a
"complete, entire, and workable law" (quoting State ex rel. Wis. Tel. Co. v. Henry, 260 N.W.
486, 491 (Wis. 1935)); New Mexico ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975, 982 (N.M. 1974)
("The Governor may not distort, frustrate or defeat the legislative purpose by a veto of proper
legislative conditions, restrictions, limitations or contingencies placed upon an appropriation

2009]

Using the Illinois Constitution to Attack Legislation

875

majority of the members elected to each house. Such bill shall be
presented again to the Governor and if he certifies that such
acceptance conforms to his specific recommendations, the bill shall
become law. If he does not so certify,
he shall return it as a vetoed bill
168
to the house in which it originated.
Unlike a line-item or reduction veto, the effect of an amendatory veto
is that the entire bill remains vetoed unless and until action is taken by
the General Assembly to either: (1) accept the specific
recommendations of the governor by a majority vote, or (2) override the
169
veto by a three-fifths vote to enact the bill in its original form.
While the governor is certainly empowered to "recommend" specific
changes to a bill passed by the General Assembly, the question for
litigation is the extent of that power, and whether in a particular instance
the governor has exceeded that authority. 170 Shortly after the adoption
of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the Illinois Supreme Court confronted
the issue of the scope of the amendatory veto in People ex rel. Klinger
v. Howlett, when the governor had used his amendatory veto to
recommend that "the title of each bill be amended and that everything
after the enacting clause be stricken and entirely new textual material be
substituted." 17 1 In other words, the governor erased the entire bill and
replaced it with something else. The court recognized that the scope of
the governor's authority "has not been clearly stated either in the
constitution itself or in the committee reports or debates in the
' 172
constitutional convention."
During the Constitutional Convention, the court noted, terms like
''corrections,'
''precise corrections," "technical flaws,' ''simple
deletions," and "to clean up the language" were used to describe the
scope of the amendatory veto power.' 7 3 On the other hand, in response
to the question, "'Then was it the Committee's thought that the
conditional veto would be available only to correct technical errors?' a
committee member answered, 'No, Ma'am."' 1 74 In Klinger, the court
did not have to decide the exact scope of the governor's powers because
"[i]t can be said with certainty.. . that the substitution of complete new

168. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(e).
169. Id. § 9(d).
170. See Kirk W. Dillard, The Amendatory Veto Revisited: How Far Can the Governor's
Magic Constitutional Pen Reach?, 76 ILL. B.J. 598, 602 (1988) (discussing judicial responses to
the governor's use of the amendatory veto).
171. People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 278 N.E.2d 84, 85 (111. 1972).
172. Id. at 87-88.
173. Id. at 88.
174. Id.
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bills, as attempted in the present case, is not authorized by the
constitution." 175 Because the General Assembly had accepted the
governor's amendatory veto, the court ruled that legislation was
invalid. 176
The court has subsequently reiterated its view that "the governor may
not use the power to substitute an entirely new bill for the one passed by
the legislature ... ."177 Instead, the amendatory veto provision was
intended to allow the governor to improve a bill in "material ways," yet
not alter its "essential purpose and intent." 178 The question thus
becomes how much the governor can alter a bill without changing its
"essential purpose and intent."
The court elaborated this point in People ex rel. Canton v. Crouch,
where it approved an amendatory veto concerning the implementation
of tax increment financing districts. 179 The court explained:
[T]he power encompasses more than mere proofreading to correct
technical errors. It therefore becomes a question of guided discretion
to judge whether the changes are less than fundamental alterations but
more than technical corrections. We think the changes made in the act
at bar fall within that middle area. They were intended to improve the
bill in material ways, yet not to alter its essential purpose and intent.
The changes constituted minor enhancements which spoke to the
clarity, fairness and practical requirements of the Act. They did not
exceed the scope of the Governor's amendatory veto power.] dd
In County of Kane v. Carlson, the court considered a closer case
regarding the sufficiency of an amendatory veto accepted by the
General Assembly that made four separate recommendations to a bill
amending the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. 181 The governor's
amendatory veto recommended that: (1) educational employees be
deleted from the scope of the bill; (2) jurisdiction over a certain agency
be shifted to the Labor Relations Board; (3) the anti-injunction law be
made applicable to bill; and (4) the Board's governing body be

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See County of Kane v. Carlson, 507 N.E.2d 482, 493 (111. 1987) (citing Klinger, 278
N.E.2d at 88).
178. People ex rel. Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242, 251 (111.1980); see also Cont'l 111.
Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Zagel, 401 N.E.2d 491,495-96 (Ill. 1979) ("[I]t is clear that section 9(e) of

article IV was not intended by the voters to restrict the amendatory veto power to a proofreading
device.").
179. 403 N.E.2d at 244.
180. Id. at 251.
181. 507 N.E.2d at 484.
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expanded. 18 2 The court held that the governor did not exceed his
amendatory veto, because the court "[did] not believe that the changes
disturbed the basic purpose of the legislation or altered the system
prescribed for carrying that out."' 18 3 Accordingly, recommendations
"were consistent with the scope of the [g]overnor's amendatory veto
184
power."
Today, courts continue to recognize that "the exact boundaries of the
18 5
[glovernor's power under this section have not been totally defined."
The only boundaries are that the governor can make more than technical
corrections, but may not substitute entirely new bills. That leaves a lot
of gray area in between. As a result, anyone aggrieved by a bill in
which the governor's amendatory veto has been accepted by the General
Assembly should closely examine the governor's recommendation to
determine if the veto is potentially invalid. If a court were to determine
that the recommendations exceeded the governor's authority, then the
result would be a complete invalidation of the legislation. A court could
not simply invalidate the amendatory veto and rule that the original bill
would become effective, because the original bill was never signed by
the governor. As such, the challenger need not be aggrieved by only the
amendatory veto, but any provision of the entire bill. If the governor
exceeds the amendatory veto authority, the legislation is invalid in its
entirety, not just those provisions affected by the governor's actions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Article IV of the Illinois Constitution imposes only a handful of
procedural restrictions on the General Assembly in considering and
passing legislation-the Single Subject Rule, the Three Readings
Requirement, the Complete Section Provision, the Effective Date
Clause, and the proscription against special legislation. The legislative
article also imposes limitations on the governor's amendatory veto
powers. As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, these provisions have
occasionally been the poison arrow used by Illinois Supreme Court to
invalidate very important pieces of legislation. Most of those cases,
however, came before the court in the 1980s and 1990s. There have
been fewer and fewer challenges brought under article IV in recent
years. Nonetheless, the provisions of article IV remain a potentially

182. Id. at 493-94.
183. Id. at 494.
184. Id.
185. Dep't of Cent. Mgmt. Servs. v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 619 N.E.2d 239, 243 (111.
App. Ct. 1993).
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potent weapon for challenging legislation, but like any other weapon,
these arrows are harmless if they remain in the quiver.

